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SOLUTION OF
THE DISCLOSURE PROBLEM
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.*
T HE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY has several distinct obligations to the
plaintiff. The moral virtue of justice obliges the lawyer to make
restitution for the harm which the laborer has already sustained, and
also to prevent further harm coming to the laborer as a consequence of
the lawyer's wrongful conduct. The lawyer is obliged by charity to help
the laborer in his financial and physical necessities.
The Lawyer Unjustly Harmed the Laborer
From the terms of the problem statement, two factual conclusions
appear. The attorney wilfully made a false representation with intent that
the laborer should rely upon it, and the laborer, relying upon this mis-
representation, deprived himself without compensation of any practical
opportunity to recover on a good cause of action. In consequence of the
same misrepresentation and reliance, the laborer is exposed to serious
peril of having to endure a long period of suffering and disability.
The falsity of the lawyer's representation follows, not from any passive
concealment, but from an active concealment which is equivalent to a
positive statement that the fact concealed does not exist. The lawyer
caused the laborer to view the physical examination made by the two
doctors as a single transaction, undertaken to test the accuracy of the
hospital record on the nature of the laborer's injuries. The nature of his
injuries was the basic factor in the transaction of release and satisfaction
which the parties then contemplated. The lawyer concealed not only the
contents of the neurologist's report but even its existence and he did this
deliberately and with the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from knowing
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Professor of Law, St. John's University School
of Law.
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that he was afflicted with Parkinson's
disease. To advance this purpose, the lawyer
offered freely to the plaintiff's attorneys and
to the court the report of the orthopedist,
which referred to the shoulder injury only
and which, when thus presented alone,
seemed to confirm fully the accuracy of the
hospital record.
If x stands for the plaintiff's condition, a
for shoulder injuries and b for brain path-
ology, the true fact is reflected by the
formula x = a + b. The lawyer, purporting
to describe x, in effect declared "x = a."
Therefore, the lawyer lied wilfully to the
laborer, intending that the laborer should be
lead thereby to accept a release which, in
spite of its general terms, was not intended
to be a surrender of any rights in respect of
injuries actively concealed from him by his
adversary's agent. This release, if the man-
ner of its procurement were known, would
be held no bar at law to an action predicated
upon the injuries thus actively concealed.
But it will serve, as the lawyer intended it
should serve, to make the plaintiff and his
attorneys believe that the laborer has no
cause of action against the defendant, and
to create a bar in fact to the commencement
of any action.
Is the claim of the plaintiff in respect of
his Parkinsonism so unsubstantial or frivo-
lous that one can say he has suffered no real
harm by its loss? It has been so often de-
cided as to be a truism that a plaintiff states
a sufficient cause of action when he asserts
a physical ill which reasonably may be
related causally to an impact for which the
defendant is legally responsible. With so
much, the plaintiff has a clear right to go to
the trier of the facts with honest proof of the
causality he asserts.' His right to come into
court is not extinguished, either legally or
1 Cf. Cahill, Natural Law Jurisprudence in Legal
morally, because the defendant has honest
and competent proofs which deny causation
in the premises, nor even because it seems
probable that the defendant will succeed but
only at great cost. The medical literature
we have seen suggests that if trauma causes
Parkinsonism, it does so infrequently and
that, especially when the first symptoms
are discovered in a patient over fifty, the
disease is referred only with considerable
difficulty to trauma as a cause, or even as
a precipitating factor. Yet the laborer has
a legal and a moral right to present to the
trier of facts evidence, if it is competent and
honest, that his affliction had its origin in,
or was at least precipitated by, his fall upon
the defendant's step. The medical writers
clearly admit the possibility of establishing
such conclusions.
The Lawyer's Duty of Restitution
What has been said indicates that the
lawyer's conduct meets all three of the
moralists' tests for establishing a duty to
make restitution for damages. 2 The lawyer
acted with theological fault, for he acted
freely and with realization that he was doing
a morally evil thing, violative of the laborer's
strict right, and effective to cause real dam-
age to the laborer. The lawyer's act was, in
objective fact, violative of the plaintiff's
right not to be deprived of a cause of action
by deceit - every man has the moral right
not to be ousted or barred from enjoyment
of a right of property by means of a lie.
Finally, there is no doubt that the lawyer's
conduct was, in the objective order, effica-
cious to deprive the plaintiff of his right
without compensation.
Practice, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 23, 34-35 (Winter
1958).
2 Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 55 (Winter 1958).
It would be possible to deny the lawyer's
fault if we supposed he did not understand
that sound morality is reflected in the trite
doctrine of the law that deceit is no less
malicious when done by active concealment
than when accomplished by verbal state-
ments which are contrary to the speaker's
knowledge. Or the lawyer might be said not
to have incurred the duty of restitution if he
did not understand that the plaintiff had a
strict moral right not to be deprived in fact
of his legal right to sue. There may be some
men who have come to believe that the use
of any means, not described with explicit
detail in a criminal statute or in an opinion
ordering disbarment, is justified if it is dedi-
cated to the purpose of success - the suc-
cess of a client, of course. Since this lawyer
has manifested some qualms of conscience,
he cannot be one of these. To suppose that
the lawyer did not act here with foresight
that his action was capable and calculated
to produce the effect he intended it to have
would be absurd.
In order to incur the duty of restitution
for damage, the person who has culpably
and effectively inflicted unjust damage need
not have had a subjective realization that
the duty to restore would be a necessary
moral consequence of his conduct. It ap-
pears that the defendant's attorney has been
ignorant that his conduct imposed upon him
the duty to make the plaintiff whole, and
that only after a month had passed from
the time the release was fraudulently pro-
cured did he begin to doubt whether he was
now under some obligation to help the lab-
orer. Clearly, he has not increased his pri-
mary guilt by failing to perform, during the
period of his ignorance, the duty of restitu-
tion. He has, by making inquiry as to his
present duties, fulfilled the basic moral obli-
gation not to continue a line of conduct or
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1958
of inaction when one doubts its moral
righteousness, without using all means rea-
sonably available to resolve such doubt. But
the theological fault which is a premise to
the duty of restitution for damage requires
that there be, at the moment when the
wrongful act is done or when its effective
production of harm is wilfully permitted to
continue, actual advertence to three objects
only: the immorality of the act, its character
as a violation of the strict right of another
person, and its probable capacity to harm
that person. For such theological fault to be
incurred, it is not required that the duty of
restitution shall have been realized subjec-
tively at the time the fault was committed
or when its harmful efficacy was wilfully
permitted to continue.
The Lawyer's Duty to Save
the Laborer from Increased
Suffering and Disability
It seems clear that the lawyer alone has
in his hands the means of saving the laborer
from a very considerable additional period
of great suffering and serious disability.
While the defendant and the neurologist
may know the facts which indicate the la-
borer's present perilous situation and its
remedy, the lawyer appears to be the only
person who, in addition to knowing the
facts, understands adequately the danger
which now impends for the laborer because
the laborer has been deceived with respect
to them.
The laborer's peril arises out of two
interrelated sets of circumstances. The
medical circumstances are. set out in the
statement: If the laborer does not have
treatment of his disease in its early stages,
the degree and the duration of the pain,
suffering, and disability which characterize
the advanced stages of Parkinson's disease
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will be very much aggravated. Clearly the
laborer will not get early treatment unless
he comes to realize his affliction. The cir-
cumstances flowing from the lawyer's deceit
very seriously diminish the likelihood that
the laborer will come to this realization
in time to get treatment early enough
effectively to postpone and ameliorate the
disease's advanced stages. The man's con-
duct, as described in the statement, indi-
cates that he is inclined not to consult
physicians except when he is suffering from
an acute complaint and believes that the
doctors have or can find a remedy; he sought
treatment once, at the hospital, in such cir-
cumstances. Later, he had headaches, and
he might have been led by this fact to have
an examination which would uncover the
Parkinsonism. But the lawyer has made him
believe that competent medical men ex-
plored that symptom without being able to
suggest its cause or cure. The early symp-
toms of paralysis agitans may be attributed
readily, by a patient of this man's age, cul-
ture and experience, to approaching senility.
It is quite likely that the lawyer's deceit
in respect of the headaches will lead the
laborer to assume an attitude of hopeless
endurance toward the early symptoms of
shaking and stiffness.
The lawyer's moral responsibilty for the
harm here threatening the laborer differs
from his conscientious accountability for
the laborer's loss of his cause of action. No
harm in respect of pain, suffering or dis-
ability seems to have been actually inflicted
up to this time. If the lawyer had disclosed
the neurologist's report, the patient could
have had for his headaches no treatment
more effective than common headache rem-
edies. A delay of one month in commencing
treatment for Parkinsonism seems not to
have any real significance in the prognosis
for the advanced development of that dis-
ease. Therefore, we cannot say the lawyer
has a duty to repair or compensate for any
harm already inflicted upon the laborer's
health.
The harm to follow upon the postpone-
ment of treatment was not directly intended
by the lawyer to be a result of his deceit,
though he did so intend the plaintiff's dam-
age in respect of the cause of action. 3 Yet
this danger of greater suffering and dis-
ability which menaces the laborer is objec-
tively related to the lawyer's wrongful
deceit, not as a merely indirect or acciden-
tal effect thereof, but as a direct effect of
the lawyer's fraud.4 That a man afflicted
with a disease will not seek treatment for
it is a direct and natural result of the act
by which another deceives the patient, mak-
ing him believe not only that he has not
such a disease, but also that conditions for
which he might seek independent diagnosis
and treatment are beyond the diagnostic
and remedial powers of medical specialists.
Although this pending result of his fraud
was not the purpose intended by the lawyer
when he deceived the laborer, and although
he has recognized this danger only now, a
month after his deceit achieved the objec-
tive he did intend, still justice obliges the
lawyer to prevent this evil result from being
actualized as a direct effect of his wrongful
conduct.
The distinction between the direct and
the indirect effects of an act is so important
a factor in our moral evaluation that we
must do our best to clarify this distinction.
Take it that A, B and C are amateur
yachtsmen and strangers to each other. B
and C are on trial runs, and therefore have
experts aboard. As A overtakes B, he hails,
I Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 48 (Winter 1958).
"I think my rudder is out of line, and I feel
something else is wrong." B answers, "I
have a marine architect and engineer here.
Sail past, and I'll have them look you
over." The experts tell B that A has a list
which, to their practiced eyes, is a certain
indication that A's keel is nearly detached.
They declare that if A were aware of the
condition of his keel he would realize that
he must soon shorten sail or run certain
risk of capsizing. B has no purpose to harm
A, but he does not want the trouble of tak-
ing A in tow, which he would be expected
to do if A had to shorten sail in the sea
now running. The experts also tell B that
A's rudder is out of line, and B calls to A,
"You're right, your rudder is out of line."
Then A sails past C, whose experts remark
to C upon all the facts and indications
which B's experts have noted. A hails C,
as he had hailed B, but C, lying, answers,
"I can't hear you."
A's present peril is an effect of both lies
- he is in danger because he does not know
the condition of his keel, and both lies are
effective to keep him in ignorance of that
fact. But B's lie is calculated, in and of
itself, to stop further investigation or in-
quiry through which A may discover his
peril, while C's lie has not that inherent
tendency. If, for example, A finds an op-
portunity to make inquiry of a Coast Guard
cutter which is running a parallel course,
though not so close to A as the other
yachts, C's lie has no tendency, de se, to
make A pass up that opportunity; but in
B's lie that tendency is inherent. A's peril
is a direct effect of B's lie, but it is only an
indirect effect of C's.
The determination that the laborer's peril
is a direct, rather than an indirect, effect
of the lawyer's lie will morally qualify the
lawyer's moral obligation to relieve the
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1958
peril. Though the parties be strangers one
to another, both justice and charity oblige
the one to prevent the occurrence of dam-
ages to the other as a direct effect of his
conduct. In the absence of any special rela-
tion which imposes other duties, charity
alone requires one to prevent another's
harm which is only an indirect effect of
one's act or omission. As B, if he has now
means of signaling A, is bound by charity
and by justice to warn A, so is the lawyer
bound to relieve the laborer's peril; the
lawyer's obligation is not one of charity
only, as is the obligation of C to warn A.
The chief practical import of the con-
clusion that the lawyer here is bound by
both justice and charity, rather than by
charity only, will appear when we discuss
the causes which may excuse performance
of this duty. The principles which excuse
performance of charitable obligations are
much less strict and rigorous than those
which permit postponement of perform-
ance of a duty imposed by the virtue of
justice.
Causes Which May Excuse
Postponement of a Performance
Due in Justice
No cause will excuse performance of a
negative duty imposed by justice. If justice
forbids an act, the act is evil, and evil may
never be done as a means of accomplishing
a good purpose.
Performance of an affirmative duty of
justice may be postponed, even indefinitely,
without moral guilt, provided that the per-
formance is excused and continues to be
excused by physical or moral impossibility.'
Physical impossibility would excuse the
5 Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 49 (Winter 1948).
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yachtsman B, for example, if the weather
prevented him from overtaking A and from
sending A any effective signal. But unless
the laborer has disappeared without leav-
ing a trace, there is no imaginable physical
impossibility which will excuse the lawyer's
duty to make the laborer aware of his infir-
mity. If the lawyer is penniless and he
cannot get his client to meet the entire
cost, he is excused from his duty to com-
pensate the laborer's financial loss in re-
spect of his cause of action.
Moral impossibility of performance
raises more difficult problems. Considera-
tion of the order of goods or values in
which the person wronged and the wrong-
doer will suffer and comparison of the
quanta of the respective detriments are
helpful indications.
When we compare the plaintiff's finan-
cial loss in the fraudulent release with the
money cost of the lawyer's restitution, it is
probable that a great disparity will excuse
the lawyer - say his cost would be double
the fair value of the other's loss, and that
this loss had not reduced the plaintiff to
penury. If the parties suffer in different
orders of value, the lawyer may be excused
by a very serious loss in a higher order,
though the relative quantum of his loss is
not clearly greater than the plaintiff's. A
certainty or a great probability that disbar-
ment would be involved might well excuse
postponement of this duty. A loss of repu-
tation incidental to the revelation of his
fraud would seem to have been a risk as-
sumed in the act of willful fraud, and would
not excuse - unless the disgrace were so
great and so nearly certain that one could
say it will totally ruin the lawyer's career.
To excuse performance of the duty to
save the laborer from his peril of greatly
increased and prolonged suffering and dis-
ability, no money loss, as such, would seem
to suffice. But a great detriment in the same
order of values or in a higher order might
excuse postponement of the duty to make
the laborer aware of his perilous state of
health. That peril respects a detriment in
the order of the "goods of life." Thus, if
the lawyer grievously risks lifelong penury,
his loss is not in the order of property only,
but passes over into the order of "goods of
life." A prison term, considerably longer
than the added period of illness which men-
aces the laborer, would be a detriment in
the same order as the laborer's, and might
be considered more grave.
We are not given a statement of the law-
yer's financial condition, nor an assessment
of the value of the claim of which the
plaintiff was defrauded. But it is clear that
the duties to save the laborer from physical
peril and to re-establish his right to sue on
his claim can be accomplished by the law-
yer without immediate expenditure. Ulti-
mately, of course, the lawyer will have to
make contribution to the satisfaction of a
new release or of a judgment, but it is only
a practical certainty of an exorbitantly un-
just demand or award, or of actual penury,
which will excuse the lawyer from incurring
that risk.
It does not appear that the lawyer risks
prison or disbarment or a crushing dis-
grace, if he approaches his task with the
aid of the court. The court should be will-
ing to help the parties make a fair composi-
tion of the matter. The lawyer should fully
state the facts to the court, except that, with
unmistakable clarity, he should indicate
that he is making no admission in respect
of the intent or advertence with which he
acted. The lawyer may say that reflection
upon the consequences of his conduct has
urged upon him a conscientious duty to
appeal to the good office of the court.6 He
should declare his readiness to meet from
his own resources any expense in excess of
the sum his client should have had to pay,
absent the fraud, for a release which in-
cluded the cause of action for brain injury,
or for satisfaction of a reasonable judgment
upon that claim.
Conflicting Obligations
When one is under a moral duty which
forbids a performance imposed by another
moral obligation, the performance is mor-
ally impossible and is therefore excused.
Do the obligations of the defendant's attor-
ney, to his client and to his profession,
excuse his performance of the duties to
make restitution for the harm the laborer
has suffered and to save the laborer from
future peril?
Since the client is the beneficiary of the
professional duties here in issue, this prob-
lem does not arise if the client consents to
the lawyer's performance of his obligations
to the laborer. If the client, not wishing to
incur the trouble and expense incidental to
reopening the laborer's release, refuses this
consent, the lawyer must consider whether
his obligations to his client excuse him
from the duties he owes the plaintiff laborer.
Does the defendant have a strict right
to safeguard his present position? It seems
he has not. Even if the defendant has had
no moral responsibility in the fraudulent
conduct of his attorney, he now knows that
the position he enjoys, in having a practical
immunity from suit by the laborer, is an
advantage to which he is not morally en-
titled, for it was procured unjustly. He is,
6 Compare Opinion 673, OPINIONS OF THE COM-
MITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE Asso-
CIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYER'S Asso-
CIATION 389 (1956).
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therefore, subject to the moral duties of a
"possessor bonae fidei rei alienae" - from
the moment he discovers that he is with-
holding a right from its true owner, he is
bound to restore that right. Consequently,
he acts unjustly, from a moral point of
view, if he declines to make restitution to
the laborer and forbids his attorney to
do so.
Yet are not the duties of confidence and
fidelity, imposed upon the attorney by law,
made for the common good, so that the
immorality of an individual client's position
does not absolve the attorney of these obli-
gations? Clearly, this question must be
answered affirmatively, but the answer is
subject to distinct limitations. The duty of
confidence is not unqualified. Our courts
have held that an attorney may not claim
privilege as to communications made to him
in connection with his client's suit, not
made by the client himself, but by a person
whom the attorney interviewed as a pros-
pective witness for the client's cause.7
Under that rule, the neurologist's report in
this case is not privileged. The decision of
Judge Morrow in In re Boone8 has become
a classic description of the attorney's duties
of confidence and fidelity to his client. Yet
that opinion carefully states some of the
limits of these duties: "He is not allowed
to divulge information and secrets imparted
to him by his client or acquired during their
professional relation, except, perhaps, in
very rare circumstances. . .. " ". . . [Dlis-
closures made by a client to his attorney
involving crimes mala in se or, as in the
matter at hand, the prostitution of jus-
tice itself, are not protected by the privi-
7 See Bergmann v. Manes, 141 App. Div. 102, 125
N. Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1910).
8 83 Fed. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
9 In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944, 953 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
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lege.... "10 "The obligation of an attorney
...was never understood or intended to
justify an attorney in misleading the court
itself. . .. "I'
It does not appear that, either because
the lawyer himself has practiced the fraud,
or because the deceit was practiced in pre-
trial, the Canon on Discovery of Imposition
and Deception12 should not be construed to
cover the problem case here. "When a law-
yer discovers that some fraud or deception
has been practiced, which has unjustly im-
posed upon the Court or a party, he should
endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising
his client, and if his client refuses to forego
the advantage thus unjustly gained, he
should promptly inform the injured person
or his counsel, so that they may take appro-
priate steps."
Causes Which Discharge an
Obligation Imposed by
Charity Only
Since the virtue of justice imposes the
duties of the lawyer in respect of the plain-
tiff's accrued damages and of the peril to
the laborer's health, the more lenient prin-
ciple which excuses obligations of charity
alone has no application in this case. If it
were shown, however, that there was lack-
ing some element essentially necessary to
establish either of these duties as flowing
from justice, then that duty would stand as
an obligation of charity only, and its per-
10 id. at 960.
1 1 Id. at 962.
12 Canon 41, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
formance might be excused by operation of
the more lenient principle.
There would be such lack, for example,
if closer and more competent analysis of
the facts showed: that the concealment of
the neurologist's report was passive only,
and not unjust; that at least one of the
tests for the duty to make reparation for
damages was not met; that the laborer's
condition will not be ameliorated by early
treatment; that he will get early treatment
though the lawyer should not warn him;
or that, though the peril is real, it is only
an indirect effect of the lawyer's fraud. 13
The obligation affected by such a correc-
tion of the findings offered by the present
writer would be a duty of charity and not
of justice. Charity obliges us to save others
from harm, whatever be the evil which
affects or threatens them, and especially if
harm is a result of our own conduct, though
only indirect. Duties of charity are subject
to two limitations. Charity never obliges at
the cost of equal harm or peril to one's
self. And a truly serious harm or peril
(though it be not so grave as the neighbor's,
or affect an inferior order) will excuse one
from aiding his neighbor in any but the
most serious necessities.
If either of the duties which the defend-
ant's attorney owes to the plaintiff were im-
posed by charity only, performance thereof
might be excused by a serious risk of not-
able loss to the lawyer, in money or in
reputation.
13 Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 50-52 (Winter 1958).
